Superintendent/Occupant is Just Trying to Get Internet Like Everyone Else
In a recent decision, the Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a Supreme Court, Nassau County decision that granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment to dismiss plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action.
In Acevedo-Espinoas v. RH 250 Sherman Avenue LLC, et al., 2024 NY Slip Op 04365, plaintiff alleges that while he was installing cable and internet service in a basement apartment, he was injured when he fell from a ladder during the course of his work. Plaintiff was employed by a non-party entity at the time of the subject incident and the building was owned by the moving defendant. Plaintiff was hired by the superintendent, who resided in the apartment where the subject incident took place.
In their motion, the defendants argued that plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240(1) claim must be dismissed because plaintiff was working at the subject premises without the knowledge or authorization of the owners or building management, and the nature of his work lacked the sufficient nexus between the defendants and plaintiff. This argument stems from an underlying dispute between the parties regarding whether the superintendent/occupant of the basement apartment hired plaintiff in his capacity as superintendent or as occupant of the basement apartment. The defendants also argued that plaintiff work is not work of the nature that is covered under Labor Law § 240(1).
In opposition and in support of his cross-motion, plaintiff argues that he fell from an unsecured ladder, which did not afford proper protection. Plaintiff additionally argued that plaintiff was hired by the superintendent of the subject premises on behalf of the owners/management and not by the superintendent in his capacity as the occupant of the subject apartment.
The Supreme Court, Nassau County held that the defendants established that they did not authorize or have knowledge of plaintiff’s work, warranting dismissal of plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action. It cited long standing precedent stating:
“To come within the special class for whose benefit absolute immunity is imposed, a plaintiff must demonstrate that ‘he was both permitted or suffered to work in a building or structure and that he was hired by someone, be it [the] owner, contractor or their agent.’” Abbatiello v. Lancaster Studio Assoc., 3 N.Y.3d 46 (2004).
Defendants successfully established that the superintendent hired plaintiff in his capacity as an occupant and that he paid for the instillation and cable bill with his wife out of his own pocket. As a result, plaintiff could not establish the causal nexus between defendants and plaintiff’s work required to fall under the protections of Labor Law § 240(1). The Second Department agreed, citing the same precedent as the lower Court.
Don’t make assumptions that a causal nexus exists between the plaintiff’s work and the defendant. Despite it seeming that every fall from a ladder is a potential Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action, there are prerequisites that have to be established. These include plaintiff’s work establishing a nexus between the defendants, as in this matter, qualifying under the statute. Another is plaintiff’s work being covered under the statute generally, which here, may not have qualified as “construction, renovation or excavation” under the statute. The Court did not reach this issue, however.
The Acevedo-Espinosa decision can be found here.
For additional information, contact Philip D. Priore, Esq. and/or Michael J. Shields, Esq.
This article was prepared by McCormick & Priore, P.C. to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is in no way intended to provide legal advice or to create an attorney-client relationship. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of McCormick & Priore, P.C.
