Rube Goldberg Machine Accidents Do Not Automatically Fall Under Labor Law § 240(1)
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court, New York County dismissed plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240(1) claim as to all defendants. That same decision granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to Labor Law § 241(6) as predicated on a violation of Industrial Code § 23-1.7(e)(2).
In Stender v. 32 Slipstream, LLC, plaintiff alleges that while performing work at a construction site as a carpenter, he tripped on debris, causing him to lose his balance and bump into a metal stud that he was in the process of installing, causing a clamp to come loose, which caused a two-pound metal brace on the stud to fall from chest level and strike his wrist. At the conclusion, the parties moved for summary judgment.
As to plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action, the Court found that the subject incident occurred when plaintiff tripped on the debris on the ground, causing him to lose his balance, grab a metal stud, knocking loose a clap, which caused a two-pound metal brace to fall from chest level and strike plaintiff’s wrist. The Court held that the accident occurred as a result of a tripping hazard, which was “wholly unrelated to the risk which brought about the need for the safety device in the first place” (Cohen v. Memorial Sloan-Kettering Caner Ctr., 11 N.Y.3d 823 (2008)) and was therefore not a height-related hazard that would require protective devices under Labor Law § 240(1). The Court rejected plaintiff’s argument that because the brace was a falling object, it is a risk that is protected under Labor Law § 240(1). For a falling object to come within the protection of Labor Law § 240(1), plaintiff must demonstrate that at the time the object fell, it was being hoisted or secured, or required securing for the purposes of the undertaking, and plaintiff provided no evidence establishing that the two-pound brace required securing for the purposes of its instillation at chest or eye level. Moreover, the three-foot fall of a two-pound object constituted a di minimis distance, and a short distance fall of a lightweight object does not generate the type or amount of force contemplated by Labor Law § 240(1).
Turning to the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action, as predicated on § 23-1.7(e)(2) (“tripping hazards”), the Court found that plaintiff was injured when he tripped on debris and/or scattered materials in his work area, bringing the accident within the scope of § 23-1.7(e)(2). Notably, plaintiff argued that the debris that he tripped over was not integral to the work being performed, and none of the defendants opposed. The Court held that plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to summary judgment as to his Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action. The Court rejected the defendants’ argument that they did not have sufficient notice of the debris that caused the subject incident because Labor Law § 241(6) does not require notice. Lastly, it rejected the defendants’ argument that plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the subject incident, as plaintiff has established the existence of a § 241(6) violation – an accumulation of debris in his work area – proximately caused the subject incident and he therefore cannot be the sole proximate cause of the subject incident.
Falling object cases coming within the purview of Labor Law § 240(1) require a deeper analysis than the “fall from height” or “sudden moving ladder” syndrome cases. In order to qualify Labor Law § 240(1) protections, the falling object must have an appropriate weight to distance traveled ratio, with heavier objects traveling short distances qualifying under the statute. Lighter weight objects would need to travel further distances in order to qualify.
The Stender decision can be found here.
For additional information, contact Philip D. Priore, Esq. and/or Michael J. Shields, Esq.
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