In Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 349 A.3d 835 (Pa. 2026), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently revisited the admissibility of expert evidence pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence. The Court had to explore whether, in the event that expert testimony is presented, but is not required by law, the testimony must comply with the legal standards that apply to expert testimony. The Court determined that the answer, unequivocally, is yes.
In Fitzpatrick, a woman drowned to death when the ATV she was driving with her husband reportedly flipped backwards and threw them both into a creek. The husband survived the incident, called the police, and reported the accident. After initially determining that the death was accidental, subsequent investigation revealed other incidents that placed the cause of death in doubt, as well as evidence of an affair the husband was having and a note signed by the decedent on which it was written that “if anything happened” to her, her husband had caused it. An autopsy by a forensic pathologist showed twenty-five different injuries and accident reconstructionist determined that the accident could not have occurred according to the husband’s account without him suffering similar injuries. While the forensic pathologist determined that the decedent had drowned and the circumstances surrounding her death were suspicious, she could not determine the manner of death with any degree of certainty.
The husband was charged with first-degree murder. At trial, the forensic pathologist could not offer a definitive opinion on the manner of death and testified that the injuries were “consistent with an accident.” While it was “possible” that those injuries were consistent with being held under water, they could also have been caused during attempts of resuscitation or the embalming process. However, the husband was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison, without the possibility of parole.
Post-sentence motions argued that the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient and did not prove that an unlawful killing occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury must have engaged in speculation to reach their verdict based on the forensic pathologist’s testimony. The Commonwealth subsequently submitted an additional report from Dr. Caruso, who determined “the likelihood of the events just preceding [the decedent’s] death occurring as described by her husband, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, is minimal at best.” The trial court acknowledged that Dr. Caruso was “eminently qualified” to offer an opinion on the cause of death, but that, as to manner of death, he could only speculate. Dr. Caruso stated that he held his opinions to a “reasonable degree of medical certainty.” However, because Dr. Caruso’s opinion was based only upon disproof of an alternative theory, equivocal conclusions, and “imperfectly designed” experiments, the trial court could not “conclude that the Commonwealth has met its burden, by a substantial quantity of legally competent evidence, that the manner of death was the result of an unlawful killing.”
However, because the decedent’s body bore significant physical injuries and the husband had suffered nearly none, Dr. Caruso determined that the death could not have occurred in the accidental manner suggested by the husband. During the re-trial, on direct examination, Dr. Caruso held these opinions to a reasonable degree of medical certainty but, during cross-examination, Dr. Caruso retreated from this earlier opinion, stating that, “manner is actually more likely than not, not to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,” and Dr. Caruso then stated that he “think[s] the manner of death is homicide.”
Drawing from Commonwealth v. Smith, 808 A.2d 215, 229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (expert testimony is not necessary to prove the manner of death), the trial court determined that the manner of death can ordinarily be determined by a jury without the assistance of a witness and would have to in this case, because Dr. Caruso’s opinion failed to meet the criteria for the admission of expert testimony. The Superior Court then analyzed the case utilizing Commonwealth v. Spotz, 756 A.2d 1139, 1155 (Pa. 2000) (holding that a pathologist was qualified to testify as to the manner of death, even though those determinations generally fall within the province of a coroner), and Griffin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., Braddock Hosp., 950 A.2d 996, 1000 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (the testimony of an expert who could only opine that it was 51% likely that a medical personnel member caused injury to the plaintiff was inadmissible because it did not meet the requisite degree of medical certainty standard). The court distinguished Fitzpatrick from Griffin by stating that Griffin was a civil case and regarded the cause of injury, whereas Fitzpatrick is a criminal case and the testimony regarded the manner of death. The court concluded that while a jury is permitted to determine cause without the assistance of expert testimony, once the Commonwealth elected to present such testimony to aid the jury, the expert opinions need only to be “probable,” not “certain,” because they are medical opinions, not legal conclusions, and the jury could assign the weight to be afforded to the testimony.
The Supreme Court disagreed. They found that the Superior Court decision was not consistent with the holding in Spotz. In Spotz, the concern was with the substance of the expert’s opinion and the court’s job was to ensure that the opinion was “based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty rather than upon mere speculation.” Furthermore, they found the Superior Court erred in assuming that Griffin was inapplicable because the Rules of Evidence apply to civil and criminal equally, and Griffin regarded the reasonable certainty standard and not the topic of the testimony.
Unlike the lay witness, an expert’s testimony is not limited to what they personally observed; they are permitted to offer an opinion that “embraces an ultimate issue.” Citing a list of an unbroken line of cases applying the standard, the Fitzpatrick Court recognized that experts could testify to matters beyond the scope permitted to lay witnesses does not mean that expert testimony knows no bounds. An expert’s testimony must adhere to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702, which provides the qualifying requirements to be met before an expert may provide an opinion. An expert’s opinion must be expressed with reasonably certainty, and it is not limited to medical opinions. The court highlighted that the “reasonable certainty standard” has been used in Pennsylvania since the early to mid-1970s and it has been routinely applied ever since, but it was never required that an expert use any “magic words;” instead, a court must review the substance of testimony, which, however stated, must demonstrate that the opinion was “based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty rather than upon mere speculation.”
Returning to Dr. Caruso’s testimony, while he used the “magic words” of reasonable certainty, the remainder of the testimony demonstrated the “magic words” were not actually Dr. Caruso’s level of certainty as of the manner of the decedent’s death. The testimony was found to be, at times, equivocal and speculative, as Dr. Caruso used conditional terms such as “possibly,” unlikely,” “I don’t think,” and “consistent with.” Considering the testimony provided laid doubt to Dr. Caruso’s degree of professional certainty, the Supreme Court determined that the testimony was not admissible to opine on the decedent’s manner of death.
In short, the Supreme Court determined that all expert opinions must be held to a reasonable degree of certainty. In finding that Dr. Caruso’s testimony did not meet the requisite standard, the Court explained that Pennsylvania law has been clear and consistent on this issue, regardless of the discipline involved. The Fitzpatrick holding is yet another in the long line of uninterrupted cases, consistent with the evidentiary rules, providing for an application of the “reasonable certainty standard” that focuses on the substance of the expert’s testimony and not simply whether the expert uses the “magic words” of “to a degree of professional certainty, but that the “reasonable certainty” standard is a bar that the proposed expert must reach.
The Fitzpatrick Opinion can be found here.
For additional questions, please contact Conrad James Benedetto, Esq. and/or Steven E. Tambon, Esq.
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